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This study tested whether people have an accurate sense of how good their reasoning is, as measured 
by their confidence in their responses, and how good they feel after they give those responses. First, 
incorrect responders were unjustifiably confident in their responses. However, correct responders 
were even more confident, and this confidence boost was found to come from their awareness of 
alternative solutions that are intuitive but incorrect. An affect measure revealed the same pattern: 
correct responders felt better, and incorrect responders felt worse, after they solved reasoning 
problems, but this was only the case when post-reasoning affect was measured after participants 
were instructed to think of alternative solutions. Implications are discussed for the possibility of 
implicit error monitoring, the role of counterfactual thinking in meta-reasoning, and the use of 
affective measures in meta-reasoning research.  
 






Research on meta-reasoning has studied the confidence that people have in their 
reasoning. Several findings stand out in this literature: 1) incorrect responders are 
confident (i.e., overconfident; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Mata, Ferreira, & Sherman, 
2013; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2017); but 2) correct responders are 
even more confident, presumably because they are aware of alternative misleading 
responses that they were able to override (Mata & Almeida, 2014; Mata et al., 2013); 
and 3) even though incorrect responders are overconfident, they might nevertheless 
have some awareness of their errors (De Neys, 2012).  
This study offers new tests of these hypotheses. First, this study uses two kinds 
of metacognitive measures: confidence and affect. Whereas confidence has been 
widely investigated in meta-reasoning research (e.g., De Neys, Cromheeke, & 
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Osman, 2011; Mata et al., 2013; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011), 
the use of affective measures is more recent (Klauer & Singmann, 2013; Morsanyi 
& Handley, 2012; Trippas, Handley, Verde, & Morsanyi, 2016). The purpose of 
using these measures is to test whether incorrect responders can somehow feel it 
when they commit reasoning errors. Whereas previous research asked reasoners to 
express how much they liked certain problems, the present study assessed reasoners' 
general affect. Specifically, the most popular measure of affect was used: the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Can 
people's momentary affect signal their metacognitive assessments? Is the impact of 
meta-reasoning so deep as to make people feel better or worse from one moment to 
the next, not just liking some propositions better than others, but actually feeling 
overall better or worse? And how do different metacognitive measures – confidence 
and affect – relate to each other? 
The second contribution of this research is to offer a new test of the 
metacognitive advantage model (Mata et al., 2013) whereby the reason why incorrect 
responders are confident (i.e., overconfidence), but correct responders are even more 
confident than incorrect ones (i.e., a confidence boost), is that the former lack 
awareness of alternative solutions and think that theirs is the only possible response, 
whereas correct responders are aware of the alternative intuitive solution. If this is 
true, any procedure that heightens this awareness of alternatives should make correct 
responders feel better and more confident, whereas incorrect responders should feel 
worse and more doubtful. This study experimentally manipulated this awareness of 
alternatives by using a counterfactual instruction: After having completed a set of 
reasoning problems (the Cognitive Reflection Test; Frederick, 2005), participants 
were asked to indicate alternative solutions, different from the ones they produced. 
Participants rated their confidence in their solutions twice, before and after they 
thought of the alternative solutions. Correct responders were expected to feel more 
confident, and incorrect responders less so, and this was expected to depend on 
whether they thought of the relevant counterfactuals. Thus, the difference in 
confidence before vs. after the counterfactual thinking exercise should relate to the 
type of counterfactual solution generated: correct responders should be more 
confident to the extent that they thought of the alternative intuitive solution, whereas 
if incorrect responders realize that there are better alternative solutions, they should 
become less confident. 
As for the affective measure, participants completed the PANAS both before 
and after they completed reasoning problems. Critically, the timing of the second 
PANAS measurement was manipulated across participants: some participants 
completed it after having solved the problems, but before the counterfactual exercise 
where they were explicitly instructed to think of alternative solutions; other 
participants completed it after they solved the problems and after the counterfactual 
exercise. This manipulation aims to test the implicit nature of error detection (De 
Neys, 2012). If error detection is efficient and spontaneous, then it should not be 
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necessary to explicitly prompt participants to consider alternative solutions; incorrect 
responders should know at some level that their responses are not the only possible 
ones, or even the most correct ones. If, on the other hand, incorrect responders only 
show signs of error detection upon being explicitly asked to reconsider their 
solutions, this would suggest that implicit error detection is not as spontaneous and 
efficient as previously hypothesized.  
Finally, if affect taps onto confidence, that is, if it serves as a metacognitive 
signal of how sound one's reasoning is, then post-reasoning affect and confidence 







Ninety-one undergraduates from the University of Heidelberg participated and 




First, participants responded to the PANAS, which measures positive and 
negative affect, each with 10 items. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent 
they felt several emotions (e.g., interested, proud, nervous, upset) at that moment, on 
a scale from 1 - very slightly or not at all, to 5 - extremely. The 20 items were 
presented in random order. The PANAS scores presented in the results section below 
were calculated by averaging the ratings for positive affect items and negative affect 
items separately, and then subtracting the latter from the former, such that positive 
scores indicate positive affect. 
Then, participants answered versions of the 3 problems in the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (modified in their content, so as to minimize familiarity), after which 
they were asked "How confident are you that your answers to the previous problems 
are correct, on a scale from 1 - not at all confident to 9 - very confident?", as well as 
"How satisfied are you with the answers that you gave to the previous problems, on 
a scale from 1 - not at all satisfied to 9 - very satisfied?"  
After that, participants received the following instructions: "Now you are going 
to see the same three problems again. But this time, instead of presenting your 
solutions, we want you to indicate alternative solutions that other people might have 
given to these problems. For each problem, write down a different solution than the 
one you gave." Participants were then showed the problems again, and for each of 
them they were asked: "What response might other people have given to this 
problem, other than the one you gave?"  
PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS, 28 (2019), 1, 115-124 
 
118 
Participants were asked to respond to the PANAS scale a second time, using the 
same instructions as before. For half the participants, this second PANAS 
measurement was done only after they had listed alternative solutions that other 
participants might have presented. For the other half, it was requested before the 
alternative generation task.  
Finally, participants were asked to rate their confidence in their initial responses 
again: "Think back to the responses that you gave the first time the problems were 
presented to you. How confident are you that the responses that you gave in the 
beginning are correct, on a scale from 1 - not at all confident to 9 - very confident?"; 
"How satisfied are you with the answers that you gave in the beginning, on a scale 
from 1 - not at all satisfied to 9 - very satisfied?" 
In short, in one condition, participants 1) completed the first PANAS 
measurement, 2) solved the problems, 3) expressed their confidence, 4) completed 
the second PANAS measurement, 5) generated alternative responses, and 6) 
expressed their confidence again. In the other condition, steps 4 and 5 were 





Some participants failed to comply with the counterfactual thinking 
instructions: they either did not generate any alternative solution, or they simply 
repeated their solution. Rather than seeing this as a mere distraction or failure to 
comply, it might instead be seen as a consequence of the metacognitive difficulty 
that incorrect responders have in considering alternative responses. That is, the 
reason why they are so confident in their responses is that they cannot entertain the 
possibility that there are other (more valid) solutions. Indeed, performance (i.e., the 
number of correct responses; M = 1.74, SD = 1.13) correlates with how many 
alternative solutions participants were able to generate (M = 2.76, SD = 0.62), r = 
.21, p = .047. For the remainder of the analysis, only those participants who complied 
with the counterfactual instruction are considered (15 participants did not generate 
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Table 1 
Mean Affect (and SD) Before and After Counterfactual Thinking by Performance  




Order 1 (PANAS 2 Before 
Counterfactual Thinking) 
Order 2 (PANAS 2 After  
Counterfactual Thinking) 
PANAS 1 PANAS 2 PANAS 1 PANAS 2 
0 2.03 (0.90) 1.98 (0.73) 1.35 (0.45) 0.98 (0.63) 
1 1.50 (0.62) 0.99 (0.68) 1.00 (0.62) 0.39 (0.75) 
2 1.41 (0.76) 1.50 (0.23) 1.54 (0.66) 1.54 (0.57) 
3 1.24 (0.91) 1.21 (0.98) 1.28 (0.88) 1.75 (0.74) 
 
Aggregating across conditions, performance was not related to pre-reasoning 
affect (PANAS 1), r = -.09, p = .418, but it correlated at a marginally significant level 
with post-reasoning affect (PANAS 2), r =.20, p = .081.  
Critically, the difference in pre- vs. post-reasoning affect varied across order 
conditions. Performance did not correlate with the change in affect (a subtraction 
score measuring the difference in affect at time 1 vs. 2) when the second PANAS 
measurement occurred before the counterfactual instruction, r = .20, p = .229, but it 
did so when it was presented afterwards, r = .50, p = .002. Specifically, when post-
reasoning affect was measured after the counterfactual exercise, affect decreased for 
incorrect responders and increased for correct responders.  
These results suggest that counterfactual thinking influenced participants' affect. 
In order to further examine this possibility, the specific counterfactuals that 
participants generated were analyzed. In all 3 problems, incorrect responders 
generated several alternative responses, none of them consensual. For instance, for 
consistently incorrect responders (i.e., those with no correct response), the most 
frequent choices were never chosen by more than 25% of the responders, and only 2 
responses (out of all the counterfactuals generated across problems and participants) 
corresponded to the correct solutions. Consistently correct responders, on the other 
hand, were much more consensual in indicating the intuitive solutions as alternative 
responses: for all three problems, these solutions were chosen in more than 50% of 
the cases. 
A counterfactual score was created considering whether the alternative 
solutions generated by the participants were the intuitive solutions (scored as -1 for 
each problem) or the deliberative solutions (+1). First, performance correlates with 
this score, r = -.68, p < .001, suggesting that correct responders were aware of the 
intuitive alternative solution, and/or that incorrect responders were aware of the 
deliberative alternative solution. However, as stated above, this ability to think of the 
alternative response was much clearer for correct responders than for incorrect ones. 
The absolute counterfactual score (i.e., averaging across problems, and making 
negative and positive scores equivalent) is low for incorrect responders (e.g., for 
those who responded incorrectly to all problems, M = 0.14, SD = 0.22), whereas for 
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correct responders it is high (e.g., for those who responded correctly to all problems, 
M = 0.63, SD = 0.19).  
Aggregating across conditions, the counterfactual score correlated with the 
difference in affect (PANAS 1 vs. PANAS 2), r = -.31, p = .006. But this was only 
the case when the second PANAS measurement was done after the counterfactual 
exercise, r = -.42, p = .009, not when it was done before, r = -.17, p = .290. Thus, 
counterfactual thinking changed affect in the condition where that was expected: 
when it came before the second affect measurement and could therefore influence it. 
Finally, a mediational analysis (using the bootstrapping procedure suggested by 
Preacher & Hayes, 2008) tested whether the effect of performance on the difference 
in pre- vs. post-reasoning affect is accounted by the counterfactual score. However, 
this analysis did not show a significant indirect effect, 95% CI = (-0.21, 0.16). This 




Results on the two confidence items were aggregated (at time 1, α = .88; at time 
2, α = .94). Table 2 shows the mean confidence levels across time and performance.  
 
Table 2 
Mean Confidence (and SD) Before and After Counterfactual Thinking by Performance  
Number of Correct 
Problems 
Confidence 1 Confidence 2 
0 6.71 (1.99) 6.00 (2.32) 
1 4.94 (2.66) 4.47 (2.06) 
2 7.26 (1.71) 7.05 (1.67) 
3 7.81 (1.06) 7.93 (1.23) 
 
Confidence ratings before the counterfactual instruction show that incorrect 
responders were overconfident (for instance, those with 0 correct responses 
expressed confidence levels above the midpoint of the scale, t(11) = 2.97, p = .013). 
However, correct responders were even more so, such that the number of correct 
responses correlates with confidence, r = .36, p = .001. Confidence ratings after the 
counterfactual instruction show the same pattern, only even more clearly: r = .49, p 
< .001. 
The difference in confidence after vs. before between the counterfactual 
instruction correlated with performance (i.e., the number of correct responses), 
although this was only marginally significant, r = .21, p = .068. There was a trend, 
such that correct responders grew more confident, whereas incorrect responders 
became less confident (see Table 2). 
Confidence should change as a function of whether responders considered 
alternative responses. Indeed, the counterfactual score described above correlated 
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with the difference in confidence at time 1 vs. 2, r = -.33, p = .003. Actually, it already 
correlated with confidence even before the counterfactual exercise, r = -.28, p = .014, 
suggesting that these alternative solutions were already present in the minds of some 
responders, even before the explicit instruction to generate them (consistent with 
Mata & Almeida, 2014; Mata et al., 2013). However, this correlation was even larger 
after the counterfactual exercise, r = -.50, p < .001; comparing the correlation before 
vs. after the counterfactual exercise, z = 3.00, p = .003. Moreover, the effect of 
performance on the difference in pre- vs. post-counterfactual confidence is accounted 
by the counterfactual score: A mediational analysis using the bootstrapping 
procedure suggested by Preacher and Hayes (2008) revealed a significant indirect 
effect, 95% CI = (0.18, 1.30). This suggests that the degree to which participants 
grew more or less confident in their responses depended on the alternative solutions 
that they considered.  
Finally, the relation between affect and confidence was examined. Pre-
reasoning affect (PANAS 1) was not related with confidence either before or after 
the counterfactual exercise, respectively r = .10, p = .384, r = .04, p = .718. However, 
post-reasoning affect (PANAS 2) was related to both confidence measurements, 
respectively r = .40, p < .001, r = .39, p < .001. Moreover, this relation between 
confidence and post-reasoning affect was more pronounced when post-reasoning 
affect was measured after versus before the counterfactual exercise. Indeed, 
confidence (at time 2) predicted affect (at time 2), but only when affect was measured 
after the counterfactual exercise, r = .55, p < .001, not when it was measured before, 
r = .19, p = .258. In addition, confidence (at time 2) predicted the change in affect 
(from time 1 to time 2). This last result was observed both when post-reasoning affect 
was measured before counterfactual thinking, r = .44, p < .001, and after 





This study investigated whether people have a good sense of how sound their 
reasoning is, as measured by a more traditional metacognitive measure (confidence), 
as well as an affective measure, which has only recently been used in this area of 
research. First, and replicating previous findings, incorrect responders were 
overconfident in their responses (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Mata et al., 2013; 
Pennycook et al., 2017). Second, even though the confidence of incorrect responders 
was high, that of correct responders was even higher. Third, this confidence boost 
was found to come from correct responders' awareness of alternative solutions, 
which are intuitive and tempting, but misleading (Mata et al., 2013).  
This pattern also showed in participants' affect: Correct responders felt better after 
solving the problems, whereas incorrect responders felt worse. The use of the 
PANAS measure shows that metacognitive appraisals can carry over to reasoners' 
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overall affect. Further supporting this idea that affect serves as a metacognitive cue, 
confidence and post-reasoning affect were found to be related.  
Instruments such as the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; 
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) ask people whether they consider 
themselves good at reasoning, and how much they enjoy reasoning (e.g., "I enjoy 
solving problems that require hard thinking."). However, those are self-report 
measures, which suffer from the limitations of introspection (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). Indeed, such self-report measures of thinking disposition have been found to 
map poorly onto people's actual abilities to think properly about challenging 
reasoning problems. In particular, incorrect responders tend to overestimate their 
thinking abilities (Pennycook et al., 2017; see also Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
However, the present results suggest that this enjoyment aspect of deliberative 
thinking can be real: Participants' affect really did change depending on their 
reasoning; or rather, their meta-reasoning.  
Indeed, affect changed differently for correct responders (for the better) and 
incorrect responders (for the worse), but this was only the case after participants 
reflected on possible alternative responses. This study manipulated the timing of 
measurement of post-reasoning affect: For some participants, it was measured before 
reflecting on alternative responses, whereas for others it was measured after this 
counterfactual thinking exercise. Critically, affect only changed (in relation to the 
pre-reasoning baseline) when it was measured after participants thought of 
alternative responses. Specifically, it increased for correct responders, whereas it 
decreased for incorrect responders. This result serves a further demonstration that 
people's feelings about their responses are at least in part based on the knowledge (or 
lack thereof) that there are alternative responses – in the case of correct responders, 
worse responses that they avoided; in the case of incorrect responders, better 
responses that they missed (though the latter kind of counterfactual thinking was very 
rare).  
The fact that affect only changed when participants were explicitly prompted to 
consider alternative responses has implications for the debate on implicit error 
detection and logical intuitions (De Neys, 2012). Indeed, although this study did not 
use the standard test of implicit conflict detection (comparing metacognitive 
measures for conflict vs. no-conflict problems; e.g., De Neys et al., 2011), it does 
offer some answers to the question of how spontaneous error detection is. On the one 
hand, whereas correct responders were aware of the alternative intuitive solutions, 
incorrect responders were not aware of the correct deliberative solutions (that is, after 
all, why they failed to solve the problems), even when they were instigated to think 
of alternative responses. On the other hand, confidence and affect increased for 
correct responders and decreased for incorrect ones, even when the latter did not 
generate the critical counterfactuals. Considering that incorrect responders were not 
able to generate the counterfactual correct responses, the effects of the counterfactual 
exercise on their affect and confidence must have been more implicit in nature: they 
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might have suspected that their responses were not accurate, though they did not 
know exactly why. Thus, with regard to whether incorrect responders are sensitive 
to their errors (De Neys, 2012), results are mixed. However, it seems clear at least 
that this epistemic process of doubting one's incorrect responses is not as spontaneous 
as previously hypothesized. Indeed, incorrect responders were confident at first; only 
when were prompted to think of alternative responses did they revise their confidence 
from time 1 to time 2. This pattern was even clearer for the affective measure: when 
post-reasoning affect was measured before the counterfactual exercise, their affect 
was high, at the same baseline level where it was in the beginning of the experiment. 
Only when post-reasoning affect was measured after the counterfactual exercise, did 
they lower their confidence. This speaks against the spontaneous nature of the error 
monitoring process.  
At the same time, it is interesting to note that, while incorrect responders were the 
ones who generated the fewest relevant counterfactuals (i.e., the correct solutions), 
while correct responders generated more relevant counterfactuals (i.e., the intuitive 
but incorrect solutions), the counterfactual exercise seems to have changed the 
confidence of incorrect responders more than that of correct responders. Indeed, an 
additional analysis comparing the absolute change (i.e., making positive and negative 
differences comparable) in confidence from time 1 to time 2 shows that the best 
reasoners (those who responded correctly to all problems) only changed their 
confidence slightly (M = 0.17, SD = 0.38), whereas the worst performers (those who 
responded incorrectly to all problems) revised their confidence to a considerable 
degree (M = 1.67, SD = 1.56), t(11.56) = 3.28, p = .007. This might speak to the 
spontaneous nature of the counterfactual process of thinking of alternatives for 
deliberative responders (Mata et al., 2013). That is, the counterfactual exercise might 
have less of an effect on correct responders to the extent that they already engage in 
it spontaneously.  
In conclusion, these results lend further support for the metacognitive advantage 
model (Mata & Almeida, 2014; Mata et al., 2013), whereby metacognitive 
judgments are informed by participants' awareness of alternative (better or worse) 
responses. This advantage was particularly evident for deliberative reasoners, who 
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